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PROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TRIAL TESTIMONY
JOSEPH DELONEY *
INTRODUCTION
In a number of jurisdictions, public employees can be deprived of 
First Amendment protection and placed in a seemingly impossible situa-
tion.1 This situation could potentially force persons to lie under oath and
thus commit perjury in order to satisfy their State employer’s wishes, or tell 
the truth and risk retaliation at the hands of their State employer.
For public employee speech to receive First Amendment coverage,2
the employee’s speech must have been made as a “citizen upon matters of 
public concern.”3 The Supreme Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, held that 
when a person speaks “pursuant to official duties,” that person is not speak-
ing as a citizen on a matter of public concern, but rather as an employee.4
Thus, the Court concluded that “the First Amendment does not prohibit 
managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant 
to official responsibilities.”5
Without a comprehensive framework for determining when an em-
ployee had spoken “pursuant to official duties,” lower courts were left to 
struggle with the question.6 Lower courts particularly differed in applying 
* Joseph Deloney, J.D. Candidate May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Sheldon Nahmod for introducing me to the subject matter of this Note and his insights 
throughout the drafting process. I would also like to thank the Chicago-Kent Law Review for their 
thoughtful comments and editing contributions.
1. Matt Wolfe, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1473, 1490 (2010). 
2. Throughout the article, I distinguish First Amendment “coverage” from “protection.” “Cover-
age” means that the speech at issue is covered under First Amendment because it meets the criteria of 
“citizen speech on matters of public concern.” E.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) 
(citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
In contrast, “protection” means that after conducting a Pickering analysis, the employee’s First 
Amendment interest outweighs the government’s interest in managerial control. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 
2380–81. Therefore, the speech is protected by the First Amendment. 
3. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
4. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
5. Id. at 424. 
6. See Keane A. Barger, Note, Be a Liar or You’re Fired! First Amendment Protection for 
Public Employees Who Object to Their Employer’s Criminal Demands, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1553–
55 (2013) (examining the different factors and tests used by lower courts in the wake of Garcetti to 
determine whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to official duties). The Court in Garcetti
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Garcetti to situations in which a public employee provided sworn, truthful, 
trial testimony both pursuant to and outside of his or her job responsibili-
ties.7 The difficulty in assessing such cases led to questionable results.8 For 
example, in Deprado v. City of Miami, a police officer alleged that he faced 
adverse employment actions after testifying before a grand jury about po-
lice misconduct, specifically that a member of the SWAT team had planted 
evidence in a shooting incident.9 The district court found that the First 
Amendment did not protect the officer’s trial testimony, because the police 
officer spoke pursuant to his official duties.10
In order to resolve some of the discord among lower courts, the Su-
preme Court took up Lane v. Franks.11 In Lane, the Court affirmatively 
answered the “discrete question”12 of whether the First Amendment pro-
tects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony outside of
their “ordinary jobs responsibilities”13 from adverse employment conse-
declined to adopt a comprehensive framework for determining whether speech was made pursuant to 
official duties and instead suggested that the inquiry was a practical one. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
7. See Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: 
A Public Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 623, 641–44
(discussing the post-Garcetti circuit split regarding whether First Amendment protections should be 
extended to an employee who provides truthful sworn testimony pursuant to his or her official duties).
8. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by Dahlia v. 
Rodriguez, 735 F.3d. 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). Although later overruled, the Ninth Circuit in Huppert
held that the First Amendment did not protect a police officer’s trial testimony regarding corruption 
among his fellow officers because the officer testified pursuant to his official duties. Huppert, 574 F.3d 
at 706; see also Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x. 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). In Green, the chief jailer at 
the county jail testified at a hearing before the county superior court regarding whether a convicted 
murderer currently housed at the jail should be moved to a maximum-security prison. Id. at 884. At the 
hearing, the jailer testified that many of the cell door locks were broken and that she did not think the 
jail was suitable to house the prisoner in question. Id. The guard was fired for her testimony. Id. The 
court held that because the speech was made pursuant to official duties, her First Amendment rights 
were not violated. Id.
9. Deprado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 246 F. App’x. 
769 (11th Cir. 2008).
10. Id. at 1346.
11. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014). The Court in Lane explained it “granted certio-
rari to resolve discord among the Courts of Appeals as to whether employees may be fired—or suffer 
other adverse employment consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the 
course of their ordinary job responsibilities.” Id. The Court then cited to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Lane v. Franks (the decision being appealed to the Court) and the Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. 
City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008). Id. The Court’s decision to cite to Reilly is somewhat 
curious because in that case the Third Circuit expressed that it was analyzing the plaintiff’s claim as if 
he had testified pursuant to official duties: “Reilly, as an Atlantic City police officer, assisted a state 
investigation of a fellow officer and testified for the prosecution at the subsequent trial. Thus, the 
speech at issue on this appeal, Reilly’s trial testimony, appears to have stemmed from his official duties 
in the investigation.” Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
12. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
13. This was a shift from Garcetti’s language of “pursuant to official duties.” Compare Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech by public 
employees made “pursuant to their official duties”) (emphasis added), with Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 
(holding the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech made “outside the scope of his 
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quences.14 In its opinion, the Court emphasized the limited nature of its 
holding, and specifically declined to answer whether the First Amendment 
protected a public employee that provides truthful, subpoenaed testimony 
during the course of his or her ordinary job duties.15
Despite the Court’s correct holding in Lane, public employees that tes-
tify as part of their ordinary job responsibilities remain without First 
Amendment safeguards. This is troubling. The integrity of the judicial sys-
tem depends on its ability to sort fact from fiction. This vital, if not prima-
ry, function of the judicial system is undermined when a person faces 
external pressures that could potentially cause them to give false or mis-
leading testimony. Moreover, the public employees that are most vulnera-
ble under the Court’s current doctrine are persons whose testimony the 
judicial system absolutely depends on for accurate and truthful state-
ments.16 For example, police officers, state and federal regulators, and fo-
rensic analysts that regularly testify during grand jury proceedings and 
trials remain unprotected simply because these employees testify as part of 
their ordinary job duties. And although the government must be able to 
regulate the conduct of its employees and retain control over employee 
behavior, the employee’s interest as a citizen cannot be ignored.
Every citizen—irrespective of employment status—bears the obliga-
tion to provide truthful testimony whenever he or she takes the stand. This 
is a legal duty and one not easily escaped.17 Because of this duty, it is nec-
essary to recognize the concurrent roles the employee occupies when testi-
fying before an adjudicatory body: government employee and citizen. Once 
these dual roles are acknowledged, it becomes clear that from time to time 
an individual’s interest as a government employee and interest as a citizen 
will be diametrically opposed to one another. On the one hand, employees 
will be legally obligated to tell the truth when testifying, even if damaging 
to their employer. On the other hand, if employees provide such testimony, 
ordinary job responsibilities”) (emphasis added). The Court seemed to refine its conception of Garcetti
and unequivocally reject the broad interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. See infra Section I.D.
14. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
15. Id. at 2378 n.4 (“We . . . need not address in this case whether sworn testimony would consti-
tute citizen speech under Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job duties, and 
express no opinion on the matter today.”).
16. See Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ala. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2377 (2014) (No. 13–483), 2014 WL 
950813 [hereinafter ACLU Brief] (“In fact, if anything, the public has an especially strong interest in 
according protection to witnesses who regularly testify on behalf of the government. Juries give great 
weight to the testimony of such witnesses, yet the witnesses are at the same time at unique risk of 
reprisal for giving truthful testimony that is adverse to the government’s interests.”).
17. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). 
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712 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
then they can potentially face adverse employment action, such as termina-
tion.
Therefore, in order to accommodate these competing interests while 
still allowing the government to exert managerial control over its employ-
ees, Garcetti’s complete bar to First Amendment claims based on speech 
made in the course of an employee’s ordinary job duties should not apply 
to testimonial speech—speech made before a grand jury, at criminal or 
civil trials, or when under oath during a judicial proceeding.
This Note proposes a rule that provides for an exception to Garcetti 
when the speech at issue is trial or grand jury testimony and adopts an ap-
proach that would classify compelled or voluntary testimonial speech, in a 
criminal or civil context, as per se “citizen speech” speaking to a “matter of 
public concern.” From there, courts would apply the typical balancing test 
the Supreme Court articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, dis-
cussed infra, to determine whether a public employee’s First Amendment 
free speech rights were unconstitutionally infringed upon.18 Furthermore, 
this Note will argue that, in light of Lane, that such a rule would strike the 
proper balance between the competing interest of the State and the employ-
ee, and provide a workable framework for courts to analyze these types of 
cases.
To that end, in Part I, this Note will examine several of the Supreme 
Court’s leading decisions regarding First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech in the public employee context. Drawing from the cases discussed 
in Part I, Part II will synthesize the Court’s guiding principles for analyzing 
First Amendment claims in the public employee context. Part III will ex-
amine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chrzanowski v. Bianchi19 and the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City.20 Utilizing these 
cases in conjunction with Lane, this Note will argue that an adoption of this 
Note’s proposed rule would sufficiently protect the government’s interest 
in maintaining efficiency and control over its employees, while still pro-
tecting the employee’s First Amendment interests as a citizen commenting 
on a matter of public concern.
18. In Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 
(1968), the Court articulated the foundational test for determining whether the First Amendment prohib-
ited a government employer from taking adverse employment action against an employee based on the 
employee’s speech. For further discussion, see infra Part I.A.
19. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013).
20. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
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I. FROM PICKERING TO LANE
For many years, public employee First Amendment protections were 
severely degraded.21 As Justice Holmes put it, “[A policeman] may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”22 In other words, the individual forfeited rights that, but for the 
person’s public employment, ordinarily would be protected by the First 
Amendment. This “unchallenged dogma,”23 however, began to change in 
the 1950s and mid-1960s.24 And in the late 1960s, the prevailing notion of 
Justice Holmes’s time—that because of their employment, public employ-
ees give up First Amendment protections—finally came to a head, and was 
put to rest in the Court’s leading decision concerning modern freedom of 
speech protections in the public employee context—Pickering v. Board of 
Education.25
A. Pickering v. Board of Education
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Pickering v. Board of Education,
one of its seminal cases regarding public employees’ First Amendment 
rights to freedom of expression. At issue in Pickering was whether a teach-
er’s letter to the editor published in a local newspaper was protected First 
Amendment speech.26 In the letter, Marvin Pickering, a public school 
teacher, criticized the local Board of Education for a proposed sale of dis-
trict bonds in order to finance new athletic facilities at the high school.27
The letter also personally criticized the district’s superintendent.28 Upset 
with Pickering’s letter, the Board fired Pickering.29 Pickering eventually 
appealed his dismissal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which rejected his 
claim.30 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding that 
Pickering’s First Amendment rights had been violated.31
21. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952). 
22. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), abrogated by O’Hare Truck 
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
23. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967).
25. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 
(1968).
26. Id. at 564–65.
27. Id. at 566.
28. Id.
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 567–68. 
31. Id. at 565.
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In its decision, the Court first reaffirmed the principle that public em-
ployees’ constitutional rights may not be subjected to unreasonable re-
strictions or conditions as part of their employment or as a requisite of 
employment.32 But the Court also noted that the “State has interests as an 
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly 
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general.”33 Thus the Court concluded that, the central issue in 
cases concerning public employee First Amendment speech is to “arrive at 
a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an em-
ployer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”34
The Court began its balancing test by initially distinguishing between 
the true and false statements contained in the letter.35 Regarding the state-
ments that could be taken as true, the Court unequivocally rejected that 
those statements provided a basis for Pickering’s dismissal.36 The Court 
reasoned that these statements in no way disrupted the efficiency of the 
school or its proper function because the statements were aimed at the 
Board and the school superintendent, none of whom worked directly with 
Pickering.37 As such, the Board could not adequately show that the state-
ments were so disruptive that they provided a basis for Pickering’s dismis-
sal.38
As for the statements considered false, the Court found those too were 
protected.39 The Court determined that the Board had shown neither any 
evidence suggesting there was actual reputational harm to the Board nor a 
resultant controversy or conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, 
or residents of the district.40 And Pickering’s false statements were not 
made recklessly or knowingly.41 Consequently, the Board only had a min-
imal interest in limiting Pickering’s contribution to public discourse as a 
citizen.
32. Id. at 568. 
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 570.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 569–70. 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 570–71. 
40. Id.
41. Id. at 574.
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The Court then assessed Pickering’s interests that were implicated 
when he wrote the letter. Critical to the Court’s analysis was the fact that 
Pickering was speaking on a matter of “public concern” in his letter. The 
public concern the Court identified was “whether a school system required 
additional funds.”42 Considering the nature of the “public concern,” the 
Court determined that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a commu-
nity most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds 
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.”43 The Court con-
cluded that, “it is essential” that teachers be able to comment on such mat-
ters “without fear of retalia[tion]” from their employer.44 As such, 
Pickering had a significant interest in commenting on a matter of public 
concern when he wrote his letter to the newspaper.
Because Pickering had a significant interest in commenting on school 
funding and the government could show little to no institutional disruption, 
the Court struck the balance in Pickering’s favor. Accordingly, the Court 
held that the Board did indeed violate Pickering’s First Amendment rights 
when it fired him for expressing his dissatisfaction in his letter to the edi-
tor.45
The Court’s opinion in Pickering is significant because it laid the 
foundational framework for analyzing First Amendment freedom of speech 
issues in the context of public employment. The Pickering balancing test 
weighs the employee’s interests as a citizen commenting on a matter of 
public concern with the state’s interests as an employer in promoting effi-
ciency.46 However, in laying out this template by which to analyze these 
types of claims, the Court did not provide exact tests or definitions for low-
er courts to follow in analyzing what constitutes “matters of public con-
cern” or “citizen” speech. Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the Court’s 
reasoning seemed driven by the fact that Pickering was commenting on a 
matter of public interest. Although the Court did characterize the case as 
one about a “teacher [making] erroneous public statements upon issues 
then currently of public attention,” there was little attention focused on 
whether Pickering was commenting as a citizen or employee.47
42. Id. at 571.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 574–75.
46. Id. at 568.
47. Id. at 572.
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B. Connick v. Meyers
The Court, in Connick v. Myers,48 attempted to clarify some of the 
ambiguity left in the wake of Pickering. In Connick, the Court was asked to 
determine whether the First Amendment prohibited a State employee from 
being terminated over a survey circulated around her office concerning 
internal office affairs.49 The Court held that it did not.50
Shelia Myers was an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans 
working in the criminal division.51 After five years, Myers was informed 
that she was going to be transferred to a different division of criminal 
court.52 Myers objected to the transfer and expressed her concerns to her 
supervisors and peers.53 Additionally, Myers drafted and distributed a ques-
tionnaire to her fellow employees.54 In the survey, she solicited their opin-
ions regarding the office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a 
grievance committee, the level of confidence they had in supervisors, and 
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.55 Myers’ 
immediate supervisor learned of the questionnaire and informed District 
Attorney, Harry Connick, that Myers was attempting a “mini-
insurrection.”56 As a result of circulating the survey, Myers was fired.57
Myers brought suit alleging she was fired for exercising her First 
Amendment rights in distributing the questionnaire.58 The Court began 
analyzing Myers’ claim by reiterating the central tenant of Pickering: the 
Court must attempt to find “a balance between the interest of the [employ-
ee], as a citizen . . . [and] as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”59 The Court then pro-
ceeded to point out that the district court misunderstood Pickering’s re-
quirement that the employee speak “as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern.”60 After recounting cases in which employee 
48. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
49. Id. at 140.
50. Id. at 142.
51. Id. at 140.
52. Id. 
53. Id.
54. Id. at 141. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.
57. Id. 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 142. 
60. Id. at 143. 
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speech had been characterized as a “matter[] of public concern,”61 the 
Court came to the conclusion “that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly 
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,” then 
there would be no reason to inquire into the reasons for her termination.62
In other words, whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern 
is a threshold question that must be addressed before proceeding to the 
Pickering balancing test.
Accordingly, the Court held that when a public employee speaks not 
as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but rather as employee upon 
matters of personal interest, the courts are not the proper place to review a 
personnel decision taken by an agency.63 To determine whether the em-
ployee speech touches on a matter of public concern, the Court instructed 
that the speech be analyzed by accounting for its “content, form, and con-
text . . . as revealed by the whole record.”64 Further, it also suggested that a 
“public concern” was “any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community.”65 Lastly, the Court noted that the question of whether the 
employee’s speech met the threshold inquiry of public concern is one of 
law, not fact.66
Applying those principles, the Court found that only one portion of 
Myers’ questionnaire—the portion asking whether employees felt pressure 
to join political campaigns—touched on a matter of public concern.67 As
for the other questions within the survey, the Court held that those did not 
meet the “public concern” threshold.68 Rather, these questions were “mere 
extensions” of Myers’ personal displeasure of being transferred.69 Myers’ 
questions did not expose that the District Attorney’s office was failing to 
discharge its duties or defying the public confidence.70 Thus, the district 
61. The Court noted it had protected employee speech in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 
(1972) (protecting a college professor’s speech before a state legislature) and Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (holding that a teacher’s memorandum given to a 
local radio station, which in turn reported the contents of the memo as a news item was protected 
speech). Moreover, the Court observed that in, Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 
415–16 (1979), “[a]lthough the subject-matter of the [employee’s] statements were not the issue before 
the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory 
policies involved a matter of public concern.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.  
62. Id. 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 147–48. 
65. Id. at 146. 
66. Id. at 148 n.7. 
67. Id. at 149. 
68. Id. at 148. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 145 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 145 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
13 DELONEY FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 8:19 PM
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court erred in determining that as a whole the questionnaire touched on a 
matter of public concern. The Court also expressed concern that govern-
ment efficiency would be compromised if every employee complaint had 
the potential to evolve into a constitutional claim.71
Despite the fact that the questionnaire did minutely touch on a matter 
of public concern, the Court found that under the Pickering balancing test 
Connick was justified in terminating Myers.72 First, the Court in clear 
terms noted that the government’s burden, for proving that the termination 
of the employee was justified, varied with the nature of employee’s 
speech.73 The Court then identified the government’s legitimate purpose as 
“promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, 
and . . . maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.”74 From there, 
the Court noted the need for good working relationships in the District 
Attorney’s office, and concluded that Myers’ questionnaire undermined the 
government’s legitimate interests.75 The time, place, and manner in which 
Myers delivered the questionnaire weighed against her, because the process 
by which Myers’ presented her concerns and questionnaire to her fellow 
employees detracted from office efficiency.76 Finally, the context in which 
the dispute arose also weighed in favor of the government.77 Myers circu-
lated the survey questioning the very policy being applied to her, which 
further undermined her claim.78 As such, the Court found that “weight must 
be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the au-
thority of the employer to run the office.”79 Thus, Myers’ First Amendment 
rights were not violated.80
Connick made explicit what was already somewhat apparent81 from 
Pickering:82 For a court to entertain a public employee’s First Amendment 
71. Id. at 149. 
72. Id. at 154. 
73. Id. at 150.
74. Id. at 150–51 (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at 151. 
76. Id. at 152–53. In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court reaffirmed that in performing the Pickering
balancing test, “the statement will not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the 
employee’s expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose.” Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
77. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153. 
78. Id.
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 154.
81. Id. The Court in City of San Diego v. Roe subsequently explained that the concern of govern-
ment operations being compromised if all employee speech was subject to a Pickering analysis 
“prompted the Court in Connick to explain the threshold [public concern] inquiry (implicit in Pickering
itself).” City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2004).
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claim, the employee must have been speaking as a citizen commenting on a 
matter of public concern.83 If that condition is not met, then the employee’s 
claim must fail, and there is no need to balance the competing interests of 
the government and the employee under Pickering.84 In addition, the Court 
reiterated the need to weigh the employee’s interests and the State interest 
in relation to the speech at issue, emphasizing that the State’s burden for 
justifying its action depends on the nature of the speech at issue.85 Further, 
the Court provided some guideposts for determining what touched on a 
matter of public concern and how to weigh the employee and State’s com-
peting interests.86
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Over twenty years later, the Court, in a controversial decision, revisit-
ed the issues surrounding public employee First Amendment claims in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.87 In Garcetti, a Deputy District Attorney, Richard 
Ceballos, was informed that an affidavit used as the basis for a search war-
rant contained serious misrepresentations.88 After learning of this infor-
mation, Ceballos investigated the affidavit for himself and concluded the 
same.89 Ceballos brought this to the attention of his supervisors and pre-
pared a memorandum recommending dismissal of the case based on this 
information.90 After a meeting between Ceballos, his supervisors, and the 
officer that provided the affidavit, Ceballos’ supervisors decided to proceed 
with the prosecution of the case.91 Ceballos eventually was called as a wit-
ness by the defense during a motion to traverse, in which he expressed his 
observations concerning the affidavit.92
82. Roe also clarified what the Court thought constituted “public concern.” In Roe, a police 
officer was discharged for producing pornographic material in which he appeared in his police uniform. 
Id. at 522. The Court stated “that public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news inter-
est; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publica-
tion.” Id. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that Roe’s speech clearly did not touch on a matter 
of public concern. Id. at 526. Therefore, the First Amendment did not cover the officer’s video. Id.
Consequently, there was no need for the district court to apply Pickering’s balancing test. Id.
83. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
84. Id. at 143, 146. 
85. Id. at 150.
86. See id. 
87. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006); Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos: 
The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 108 (2007).
88. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–14. 
89. Id.
90. Id. at 414.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 414–15. 
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Ceballos alleged that in the wake of this incident he suffered adverse 
employment actions such as being transferred and passed up for promo-
tion.93 Ceballos eventually filed suit in federal district court. He argued that 
his employer violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him 
based on the memorandum recommending dismissal of the case.94 Revers-
ing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Ceballos’ memorandum 
was not protected speech.95
Citing Pickering and Connick, the Court presented a two-part test used 
to determine whether a public employee’s speech was constitutionally pro-
tected.96 First, it must be determined “whether the employee spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern. . . . If the answer is no, the employee 
does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his or her em-
ployer’s reaction to the speech.”97 But, if the employee has spoken as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern, then a potential “First Amendment 
claim arises.”98 The government then must have “an adequate justification 
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public.”99
The Court then went on to explain that individuals who enter pubic 
service necessarily give up some liberties enjoyed by citizens that are not 
employees of the government.100 This is so because the government, as an 
employer, needs to exert a certain amount of control over its employees in 
order to maintain efficiency and orderly administration of services.101 Fur-
ther, public employees are in “trusted positions in society. When they speak 
out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or im-
pair the proper performance of governmental functions.”102 However, the 
Court also acknowledged, “a citizen who works for the government is 
nonetheless a citizen.”103 Further, when an employee speaks as a citizen on 
a matter of public concern, “they must face only those speech restrictions 
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effective-
ly.”104 The Court also noted the societal benefits that flow from public em-
93. Id. at 415. 
94. Id.
95. Id. at 417. 
96. Id. at 418. 
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 418–19. 
102. Id. at 419.
103. Id. 
104. Id.
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ployees being able to speak openly on matters concerning the communi-
ty.105
The Court then turned to Ceballos’ memorandum. According to the 
Court, the fact that Ceballos drafted his memorandum and voiced his con-
cerns in the office was not dispositive.106 The fact that Ceballos’ memoran-
dum touched on the subject matter of his employment was also
nondispositive.107 Instead, the case turned on the fact that Ceballos’ “ex-
pressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”108 Ce-
ballos was not acting as a citizen while “conducting his daily professional 
activities” which included drafting disposition memorandums.109 Thus, 
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s profes-
sional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties that the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”110 Further, the Court explained 
that the government had “heightened interests in controlling speech made 
by an employee in his or her professional capacity.”111 Consequently, the 
Court held that when an employee speaks pursuant to official duties, the 
First Amendment does not prevent the government from taking adverse 
employment action against the employee for his or her speech.112
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to adopt a comprehensive 
test to determine whether an employee spoke “pursuant to official duties” 
because there was no serious debate that Ceballos indeed made his expres-
sion pursuant to his employment duties.113 The Court instead provided that 
the “proper inquiry is a practical one.”114 And, it added that overly broad 
job descriptions would not suffice in determining what constituted an em-
ployee’s job duties.115
An ostensibly straightforward rule emerged from Garcetti: Speech 
made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties is not protected First 
Amendment speech. Without a concrete framework, however, lower courts 
have applied the rule in varying ways, which has led to questionable out-
comes.116 Adding a further complication was the Court’s determination that 
105. Id. at 419–20. 
106. Id. at 420.
107. Id. at 421. 
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 422. 
110. Id. at 421–22. 
111. Id. at 422. 
112. Id. at 421.
113. Id. at 424. 
114. Id.
115. Id. at 424–25. 
116. See generally supra note 8.
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the government had a heightened interest when the speech at issue “owes 
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.” Moreo-
ver, many commentators that examined Garcetti’s future application in a 
wide variety of contexts were critical of the Court’s categorical bar to First 
Amendment claims for public employee speech made pursuant to official 
duties.117
D. Lane v. Franks
The Lane v. Franks litigation began in the Middle District of Alabama 
in 2011, but the events that precipitated the lawsuit stem back to 2006.118 In 
2006, Edward Lane was hired by Central Alabama Community College 
(“CACC”) to be the Director of the Community Intensive Training for 
Youth (“CITY”).119 CITY was a statewide program in Alabama that pro-
vided services to underserved youth.120 Lane was hired on a probationary 
basis.121 As CITY’s director, Lane was responsible for typical managerial 
functions, such as hiring and firing employees, overseeing the day-to-day 
operations, and making decisions regarding CITY’s finances.122
Prompted by CITY’s financial difficulties, Lane conducted an exten-
sive audit of the program and its expenses.123 At the conclusion of his audit, 
Lane discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative, 
had not been reporting to her post at her local CITY office.124 Lane at-
tempted to resolve the matter with Representative Schmitz, but his attempts 
were ineffective.125 In response, Lane brought the matter to the attention of 
CACC’s president and attorney, who both warned Lane not to fire Repre-
sentative Schmitz because of potential negative consequences for both him 
and CACC.126
Despite the warning, Lane fired Schmitz.127 Schmitz’s firing caught 
the attention of the FBI, which opened up an investigation into Schmitz’s 
117. Outside of public employees that typically testify as part of their ordinary job duties, com-
mentators opined that Garcetti could impinge, for example, on academic freedom in the academic 
setting. Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54,
54 (2008).
118. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. 
127. Id.
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employment with CITY.128 Schmitz was later indicted, and Lane eventually 
testified against Schmitz at a grand jury proceeding and twice at her trial.129
Steve Franks eventually took over CITY, which continued having fi-
nancial difficulties.130 Lane suggested that Franks terminate some employ-
ees to shore up the programs’ finances.131 Franks fired CITY’s 
probationary employees.132 Thereafter, Franks re-hired many of the proba-
tionary employees; Lane was not included.133 Franks claimed that he did 
not rescind Lane’s termination because of his testimony against Schmitz.134
Lane eventually sued Franks, alleging that he was discharged because 
of his testimony against Schmitz135—a violation of his First Amendment 
rights.136 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Franks.137 Relying on Garcetti, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that Lane had been acting pursuant to his official duties 
when he investigated and later testified against Schmitz.138 The Eleventh 
Circuit also erroneously concluded that although Lane testified about his 
duties compelled by subpoena in the litigation context, his speech still did 
not warrant First Amendment protection.139
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court first re-
iterated Pickering’s guiding principles: In order to determine which interest 
should prevail when the government seeks to curtail its employee’s speech, 
the court must balance the interest of the government as an employer in 
promoting efficiency and the employee’s interest as a citizen in comment-
ing on a matter of public concern.140 The Court then recounted Garcetti’s
“pursuant to official job duties” inquiry to determine whether the speech 
was made as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an employee.141
Turning to Lane’s speech, the Court first determined that Lane spoke 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern.142 The Court explained, “Truth-
128. Id. 
129. Id. Schmitz’ first trial resulted in a mistrial. She was tried again and convicted. Id. at 2375 
130. Id. at 2376. 
131. Id.
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 2367–77. 
139. Id. at 2377.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2378. 
142. Id.
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ful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his 
ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.”143
The Court noted that “[s]worn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quin-
tessential example of speech as a citizen” because “anyone who testifies in 
court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the 
truth.”144 This obligation is independent of any obligations the employee 
may have to the government as its employer.145
The Court then explained how the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far 
too broadly.146 The Court specifically rejected the notion that an employee 
is speaking pursuant to official job duties merely because the speech relates 
to information learned through the course of his employment.147 Instead, 
the critical question is “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily with-
in the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those 
duties.”148 By using the language “ordinary job duties,” the Court narrowed 
and clarified Garcetti’s holding insofar as it rejected an expansive interpre-
tation of the language “pursuant to official job duties.” Additionally, the 
Court noted that under the Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Garcetti, public 
employees would be placed in a difficult situation when they learned of 
public corruption, because that information would necessarily be learned 
through their employment.149 As such, the employee would be torn be-
tween obligations to its employer and its obligation to testify truthfully.150
The Court then held that the content, form, and context all pointed to-
wards a finding that Lane’s speech was on a matter of public concern.151
The content of the speech—government corruption—was a matter of “sig-
nificant public concern.”152 Additionally, the form and context of the 
speech cemented the conclusion that it was on a matter of public concern 
because “testimony under oath has the formality and gravity necessary to 
remind the witness that his or her statements will be the basis for official 
government action . . . .”153 The Court then balanced the employee’s inter-
est against that of the government’s and found that the scale weighed 
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2379. 
145. Id. The Court noted that perjury is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 2380. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id.
153. Id.
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heavily in favor of Lane.154 There was no evidence that the speech was 
neither false nor erroneous nor did it unnecessarily disclose privileged in-
formation.155 Moreover, it did not undermine efficiency of services or of-
fice relationships.156 Thus, the Court found that Lane’s testimony was 
protected.157
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Several important principles emerge from the cases discussed above. 
First, the principal task for courts is to balance the government’s interests 
as an employer and the employee’s interests as a citizen speaking on a mat-
ter of public concern.158 This balancing is rooted in the need for govern-
ment efficiency in providing public services, which would be compromised 
if every employment decision turned into a constitutional claim.159 Howev-
er, the Pickering balancing test seeks to reconcile that with the fact that 
public employees occupy a unique role in society. Public employees are 
often in the best position to expose government corruption and comment on 
matters concerning the public.160 Because of the public employee’s unique 
role, the employee’s interests in speaking as a citizen are tied to the pub-
lic’s interest in remaining informed as to the integrity of government opera-
tions.161
In order to guide this analysis, courts, as a threshold matter, must ex-
amine whether the speech was made as a citizen speaking on a matter of 
public concern or as an employee.162 If the person was speaking as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern, then the possibility of a First Amendment 
claim arises.163 Conversely, if the speech is made purely in the capacity as 
an employee, then the employee has no First Amendment claim based on 
the government’s reaction to the speech.164 To distinguish between citizen 
speech and employee speech, courts should look to whether the speech was 
made pursuant to the employee’s ordinary duties, meaning, more or less, 
154. Id. at 2381.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968).
159. Id. at 568; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
160. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19.
161. E.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
162. E.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
163. E.g., id. 
164. E.g., id.
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what the employee does on a day-to-day basis or as required by their ordi-
nary job duties.165 The mere fact that an employee learns of information 
through his or her employment does not automatically render the speech at 
issue “employee speech.”166 But speech which subject matter is derived 
from or related to the individual’s role as a public employee is to be distin-
guished from speech that owes its existence to the person’s ordinary, pro-
fessional job responsibilities.167 Furthermore, an employee’s job 
description is not conclusive evidence to show that the employee was act-
ing as an employee.168 Instead, the inquiry is a practical one, suggesting 
that the employee’s actual day-to-day activities or ordinary activities must 
be examined for a proper analysis of the case.169
The next question becomes whether the speech was on a matter of 
public concern. Generally, matters of public concern consist of “any matter 
of political, social, or other concern to the community.”170 This inquiry is 
guided by the content, form, and context of the speech at issue.171 If the 
court concludes that the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, the issue turns to whether the government had “an adequate justi-
fication for treating the employee differently from any other member of the 
general public.”172 The government’s burden in justifying the action taken 
against the employee varies with how substantially the employee’s speech 
involves matters of public concern.173 Thus, if the employee speech indis-
putably relates to a matter of public concern, then “a stronger showing [of 
government interests] may be necessary.”174 On the other hand, if the citi-
zen speech only minutely touches on a matter of public concern, then the 
government will have less of a burden in justifying its actions.175 If the 
government cannot adequately justify its employment action taken against 
165. Compare id. at 421 (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech by public employ-
ees made “pursuant to their official duties”) (emphasis added), with Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (holding 
the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech made “outside the scope of his ordinary job 
responsibilities”) (emphasis added).
166. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
167. Id.
168. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
169. See id.
170. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
171. Id. at 147–48.
172. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, 
Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
173. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
174. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152). 
175. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52.
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the employee for his or her speech, then there has been an unconstitutional 
infringement on that employee’s First Amendment rights.176
III. REILLY, CHRZANWSKI, AND TRIAL TESTIMONY
The Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City and the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chrzanwski v. Bianchi are instructive and 
persuasive cases illustrating the need to provide special protections to com-
pelled trial testimony made during the course of a public employee’s ordi-
nary duties. In both cases, the court recognized the dual role a public 
employee occupies when providing sworn testimony—a sentiment that the 
Supreme Court later reiterated in Lane. And a critical aspect to both Reilly 
and Chrzanowski was that the speech was made under oath during either a 
trial or grand jury proceeding, thereby transforming the public employee’s 
speech from merely employee speech to citizen speech. In reaching their 
conclusions, both courts carefully scrutinized Garcetti, and found that its 
categorical bar to claims made pursuant to an employee’s job duties did not 
apply to public employees’ trial testimony made pursuant to their profes-
sional responsibilities.
These cases help to demonstrate that a per se rule characterizing trial 
testimony made during the course of an employee’s ordinary job duties as 
“citizen speech on a matter of public concern” and existing doctrine sur-
rounding public employee First Amendment rights are not in tension. 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court specifically passing on the issue 
addressed in Chrzanwski and Reilly, Lane does indeed echo principles ar-
ticulated in those cases, underscoring the conclusion that public employee 
trial testimony made during the course of ordinary job responsibilities de-
serves First Amendment coverage.
A. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City
Six years prior to Lane, the Third Circuit took up Reilly v. City of At-
lantic City. There, Reilly, an Atlantic City police officer, assisted a state 
investigation into corruption among the Atlantic City police department.177
Reilly testified in a criminal case against a fellow officer.178 Several offic-
ers harbored animosity towards Reilly for his participation in the trial.179
Years later, Reilly was charged with creating a hostile work environment 
176. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–81.
177. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
178. Id. at 220. 
179. Id. at 261.
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and engaging in inappropriate conduct towards a subordinate.180 After an 
extensive hearing was held, an independent hearing officer concluded that 
only a four-day suspension was appropriate due to mitigating circumstanc-
es.
Despite the independent hearing officer’s conclusion, Reilly’s super-
visor—a friend of the officer against whom Reilly testified—recommended 
that Reilly be demoted in rank with a 90-day suspension or retire as ser-
geant immediately. Reilly retired. He then filed suit against his supervisor
and the police department, alleging that he was forced to retire not because 
of his most recent disciplinary action, but because he exercised his First 
Amendment rights by testifying in his fellow officer’s criminal trial years 
earlier.181 The city, on the other hand, argued that his speech was made 
pursuant to his official duties, and therefore not constitutionally protected. 
Affirming the district court, the court held that Reilly’s truthful trial testi-
mony made pursuant to his official responsibilities deserved First Amend-
ment coverage.182
In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that Reilly’s testimony 
appeared to have stemmed from his official duties in the investigation. 
However, the court reasoned that Garcetti offered no express instruction on 
the First Amendment’s application to a public employee’s trial testimony 
that arises out of his or her job duties.183 Thus, relying on well-settled law 
that dictates every citizen must provide testimony if compelled, the court 
determined that Reilly was indeed acting as a citizen when he testified at 
trial and not “simply performing his or her job duties.”184 Rather, Reilly 
was “acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates of the court and the 
rules of evidence,” and “the First Amendment protection associated with 
fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one’s status as public 
employee.”185 Moreover, the court concluded that protecting truthful testi-
mony “promotes the ‘individual and societal interests’ served when citizens 
play their vital role in the judicial process.”186
180. Id.
181. Id. at 219. Reilly contended his supervisor’s promotion was the first opportunity for him to 
take action against Reilly for his testimony. Id. at 221. In the years preceding Reilly’s disciplinary 
charge, Reilly’s mentor, who was also involved in the criminal trial, was still in the department. Id. at
220–21. Reilly alleged that after his mentor was promoted to chief-of-police and was no longer in the 
department, his supervisor began to demean him in front of other officers. Id. 
182. Id. at 231.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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B. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi
In Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar is-
sue to that in Reilly, and concluded that the First Amendment protects 
truthful, subpoenaed, trial testimony.187 In that case, Chrzanowski was an 
Assistant State’s Attorney.188 In connection with a criminal investigation 
against the State’s Attorney, Chrzanowski testified during a grand jury 
proceeding and the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.189 Allegedly, as a result of 
testifying against his supervisor, Chrzanowski’s employment with the 
State’s Attorney was terminated. Chrzanowski brought suit, alleging that 
his First Amendment rights had been violated.190
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the First 
Amendment protected the plaintiff’s speech for two reasons. First, the court 
reasoned that Garcetti did not bar the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim 
because testifying before a grand jury was not part of the plaintiff’s ordi-
nary daily activities as a State’s Attorney. The court chided the district 
court for concluding the testimony was made pursuant to his official duties 
solely because the subject matter of his testimony related to his job as a 
State’s Attorney.191
But more importantly, the court explained that even if testifying was 
part of the State’s Attorney’s ordinary job responsibilities, he spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern when testifying before the grand ju-
ry.192 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the reasoning under-
pinning Garcetti’s categorical bar to First Amendment claims based on 
speech made “pursuant to official duties” inapplicable to cases involving 
subpoenaed grand jury or trial testimony.193
According to the court, Garcetti did not protect speech made pursuant 
to official duties because such speech is of a different character than citizen 
speech. First, “restrictions on [employee] speech ‘do not infringe any liber-
ties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.’”194 Second, 
187. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 2013).
188. Id. at 736.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 739–40. That sentiment was later echoed in Lane when the Court explained, “the mere 
fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not 
transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech.” Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 
2379 (2014). The central focus of the inquiry should be on whether the speech was part of the employ-
ee’s ordinary job responsibilities. In other words, subject matter is not the dispositive factor in charac-
terizing speech as either citizen or employee.
192. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 741. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22). 
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“restrictions on [employee] speech in no way undermine the potential soci-
etal value . . . [because] employees ‘retain the prospect of constitutional 
protection for their contributions to the civic discourse.’”195 Lastly, “a con-
trary approach . . . would ‘commit state and federal courts to . . . [an] intru-
sive role, mandating oversight of communications between . . . employees 
and their supervisors during the course of official business,’ and would 
‘displace managerial discretion.’”196 Taking each justification underlying 
Garcetti in turn, the court determined each to be inapplicable.
First, the Chrzanowski court found that the individual has a strong in-
terest in complying with the demands of a subpoena because failure to do 
so can result in incarceration.197 Next, unlike typical speech made pursuant 
to official duties, the public has a strong interest in hearing truthful testi-
mony from government employees because such speech “often provides 
society with information that is essential for democratic self-
governance.”198 Moreover, threats against or punishment of retaliation for 
subpoenaed testimony would chill the employee’s contributions to the civic 
discourse.199 Finally, Garcetti’s hesitation about courts interfering with the 
government’s managerial discretion is of little consequence in cases of 
speech made pursuant to a subpoena because there is hardly any legitimate 
managerial interest in dissuading an employee from testifying when com-
pelled to testify by subpoena. Consequently, this led the court to hold that 
subpoenaed trial testimony constituted citizen speech.200
C. Trial Testimony Is Citizen Speech
Although decided without the guidance of Lane, both Reilly and 
Chrzanowski illustrate the need to characterize trial testimony as citizen 
speech, even if such speech arises during the course of a public employee’s 
ordinary duties. As the Chrzanowski court noted, the underlying justifica-
tions for not affording speech made in the course of an employee’s ordi-
nary job duties is misplaced when applied to truthful testimony conducted 
during judicial proceedings.
First and foremost, not affording truthful trial testimony protection 
undermines the integrity of the judicial system. As the Chrzanowski court 
recognized, truthful testimony “is necessary to protect the integrity of the 
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 742.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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judicial process and to insulate that process from outside pressure.”201 It 
stands to reason that allowing the government to act uninhibited in its reac-
tion to an employee’s truthful trial testimony places an undue influence on 
the employee. Employees are either, depending on the demands of the em-
ployer, potentially left to commit perjury, remain mute and be held in con-
tempt, or tell the truth and face their government employer’s retaliation. 
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Lane and noted that an em-
ployee would be placed in a compromising position if torn between loyalty 
to his employer or the truth.202 Considering the great emphasis courts have 
placed on the importance of truthful trial testimony to the integrity of the 
judicial system,203 allowing the government to take an adverse employment 
action against an employee for his or her truthful testimony, although part 
of his or her daily duties, is inconsistent with the notion that the judicial 
system acts as society’s truth seeking institution.
Protecting truthful trial testimony because it was made outside of an 
employee’s ordinary job duties, rather than during the course of such du-
ties, is a flawed distinction. The fact-finding function of trials is under-
mined no less because persons providing false or misleading testimony are 
public servants acting in the course of their ordinary job duties rather than 
outside the scope of their daily responsibilities. Moreover, the public has an 
especially significant interest in ensuring that persons who regularly testify 
as a part of their ordinary public duties are protected from adverse em-
ployment action, because they are more likely to be influential on jurors 
and others.204
Additionally, characterizing trial testimony made during an employ-
ee’s ordinary job duties as employee speech rather than citizen speech ig-
nores the dual roles and independent obligations the person taking the stand 
bears. As Lane, Reilly, and Chrzanowski make clear, a government em-
ployee is not simply an employee when providing trial testimony. Instead, 
the employee acts as a citizen because of the liberty interest at stake once 
he or she takes the stand. The Supreme Court and many lower courts have 
reiterated that it is incumbent on a witness to testify truthfully and aid in 
201. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
202. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (“Such a rule would place public employees . . .
in an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retalia-
tion and keep their jobs.”).
203. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. 
204. ACLU Brief, supra note 16, at 10.
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the judicial process.205 This duty is not lost simply by the nature of one’s 
employment; nor are persons shielded from perjury prosecution as result of 
providing false testimony simply because of their employment status. By 
divorcing the concurrent roles people play—as citizens and employees—
while testifying, employees are left in a severely vulnerable position.
Although under the proposed rule, trial testimony would be considered 
per se citizen speech, the government is not left without protections. As the 
Court noted in Lane, employees taking the stand are not free from all obli-
gations to the government as their employer. The employee could possibly 
be reprimanded for disclosing privileged or confidential information. But 
these concerns need not be addressed when determining whether the person 
taking the stand spoke as an employee or citizen. Instead, that inquiry 
should be saved for a Pickering analysis, which affords the government 
with an opportunity to offer a legitimate reason for taking its actions.
Finally, truthful trial testimony should be considered “citizen speech” 
regardless of whether it was part of the employee’s ordinary duties because 
the justifications for leaving employee speech unprotected are not applica-
ble to trial testimony. Although the Court in Lane did clarify the scope of 
Garcetti’s “pursuant to official job duties” language, the Court did not call 
into question the underlying justifications of Garcetti’s categorical bar to 
such claims. Instead, it merely clarified that speech which subject matter 
stems from one’s employment does not automatically qualify as employee 
speech. Thus, although the court squarely rejected an excessively broad 
reading of “pursuant to official duties,” Chrzanowski still provides forceful 
arguments demonstrating the inapplicability of Garcetti’s theoretical un-
derpinnings when applied to trial testimony.206 Although Chrzanowski 
arises out of the context of a subpoena, its reasoning also applies even if the 
testimony is voluntary.207
205. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (“Sworn judicial testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential 
example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testified in court bears an obligation, to 
the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”).
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. Testimony, whether voluntary or compelled, should be protected. Truthful testimony aids in 
the judicial process and serves the public good regardless of the method by which it was obtained. 
ACLU Brief, supra note 16, at 11. Whether the testimony was voluntary or compelled does not bear on 
the employee’s role as a citizen when testifying. Id. at 12–13. Moreover, in both the civil and criminal 
context, many witnesses are compelled by subpoena arbitrarily. Attorneys “issue subpoenas to witness-
es who would have voluntarily attended even absent a subpoena.” Id. at 13. Thus, regardless of whether 
the testimony was procured by subpoena or voluntarily, when an employee testifies at trial, that speech 
should be characterized as “citizen speech” and a matter of “public concern.”
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D. Trial Testimony Is Always a Matter of Public Concern
The Supreme Court has held that speech touches on a matter of public 
concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of polit-
ical, social, or other concern to the community.”208 To guide analysis of 
whether the speech in question touches on a matter of public concern, 
courts examine the “content,” “form,” and “context” of the speech.209 For 
many of the same reasons why trial testimony should always be considered 
“citizen speech,” trial testimony always meets the “public concern” re-
quirement.
The “form” and “context” in which trial testimony takes place is 
enough to elevate the speech to a matter of public concern. The speech is 
made orally under oath (form) and during a judicial proceeding (context). 
These factors weigh heavily towards categorically recognizing trial testi-
mony as a matter of public concern. As the Supreme Court has noted, “un-
like speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the formality and 
gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements will be 
the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the 
rights and liberties of others.”210
There should be no inquiry into the content of the employee’s speech 
in determining whether it touches on a matter of public concern because the 
context and form in which sworn judicial statements occur make it a matter 
of public concern.211 A witness should be able to speak freely and truthfully 
without fear of reprisal. When aiding in the judicial process, a foundation 
of self-government, employee speech should always be protected regard-
less of the content. The content of the speech will eventually be scrutinized 
under a Pickering analysis. At that time, the content of the speech must 
necessarily be weighed as a factor in determining whether the government 
had a sufficient reason to justify its response to the testimony. A rule 
providing that trial testimony constituted a per se matter of public con-
cern—even if made during the course of a public employee’s ordinary du-
ties—would still leave the government in a position to exercise a 
208. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
209. Id. at 147–48. 
210. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012). 
211. Several circuit courts have held that trial or grand jury testimony is always a matter of public 
concern. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir 2008) (holding that “trial testi-
mony is offered ‘in a context that is inherently of public concern.’”); Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood 
Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[w]hen an employee testifies before 
an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is in inherently of 
public concern.”).
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significant degree of managerial discretion in response to its employee’s 
speech.
Some concern can be expressed over whether the government would 
ever prevail under the Pickering analysis, and whether lower courts would 
provide cursory reasoning when the speech at issue was truthful testimony. 
Indeed, in adopting a bright line rule providing First Amendment coverage 
to trial testimony, it may be possible that the government will have a diffi-
cult time prevailing under a Pickering analysis. But if the government’s 
only justification for taking action against that employee is because of the 
truthful content of the employee speech, then the employee’s interest, and 
the public’s interest in hearing such speech, should place a significant ob-
stacle for the government to overcome in justifying why it took adverse 
action against the employee.
That is not to say that there will never be instances where the govern-
ment is permitted to take action against employees for their trial testimony. 
Testimony that is later revealed to be false would provide the government 
with a lawful basis for terminating the employee or taking other adverse 
action. If an employee discloses confidential information, although truthful, 
the government could take action without violating that employee’s First 
Amendment rights. In a similar vein, should an employee reveal his or her 
own misconduct or some other information while testifying that would 
warrant disciplinary action, the government would be able to take employ-
ment action. In such an event, the misconduct revealed as a result of the 
testimony would provide a lawful basis for taking disciplinary action, not 
the testimony that revealed the misconduct or incompetence. Moreover, as 
Pickering instructs, the burden on the government in justifying its actions 
will vary depending on the extent to which the employee speaks to matters 
of public concern. Accordingly, when speech touches on a matter of public 
concern solely because it is trial testimony, and the content of the testimony 
is not of significant public interest, the government will have a lowered 
burden in justifying its actions.
In essence, this rule attempts to provide a framework that affords a 
court the flexibility necessary to balance the competing interests on a case-
by-case basis without Garcetti’s rigidity, which has caused some question-
able outcomes. By categorically extending First Amendment coverage to 
trial testimony, the employee is able to speak freely and without fear of 
reprisals from their employer. On the other hand, the government still is 
afforded an opportunity to offer legitimate reasons for treating the employ-
ee differently than that of an ordinary citizen under a Pickering analysis. 
Such a system would ensure that the government’s managerial discretion 
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and interest in maintaining efficiency is preserved, while simultaneously 
safeguarding that the employee’s First Amendment rights are not unconsti-
tutionally violated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public employees’ First Amendment rights to speak freely and truth-
fully before a tribunal should not be dependent on whether the speech is 
made pursuant to their ordinary duties. As discussed above, providing spe-
cial protections to trial testimony is necessary to protect judicial integrity 
and ensure that employees are not placed under an undue burden when 
taking the stand. Withholding First Amendment protection based on 
whether the speech was in the course of one’s ordinary job duties is a dis-
tinction that does not stand up to scrutiny when applied to trial testimony. 
Consequently, courts should deem an employee a “citizen” speaking to a 
“matter of public concern” when he or she is testifying truthfully during a 
court proceeding regardless of whether it was part of his or her ordinary job 
duties.
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